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ABSTRACT
By distinguishing between foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio and
other investments (OTR), we study the effects of the composition of capital
inflows on output volatility. We develop a simple empirical model which, under
certain conditions satisfied in the data, yields three key testable implications.
First, output volatility should depend positively on FDI and OTR volatility.
Second, output volatility should be an increasing function of the correlation
between FDI and OTR. Third, for low values of the FDI share, output volatility
should be a decreasing function of the share of FDI in total capital inflows. We
find strong support in the data for all three implications, even after controlling
for other factors that may influence output volatility and dealing with potential
endogeneity problems.
JEL classification: F23; F32; F36; F44
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RESUMEN
Al distinguir entre inversio´n extranjera directa (FDI) e inversio´n de portafolio
y otras inversiones (OTR), estudiamos los efectos de la composicio´n de flujos
de capital en la volatilidad del producto. Para eso, desarrollamos un modelo
empı´rico simple donde, bajo ciertas condiciones satisfechas por los datos,
pueden evaluarse tres implicancias clave. Primero, la volatilidad del producto
deberı´a depender positivamente en la volatilidad FDI y OTR. Segundo, la
volatilidad del producto deberı´a ser una funcio´n creciente de la correlacio´n
entre FDI y OTR. Tercero, para valores bajos de la participacio´n de FDI, la
volatilidad del producto deberı´a ser una funcio´n decreciente de FDI en los flujos
totales de capital. Encontramos evidencia fuerte en los datos a favor de las
tres implicancias, incluso luego de controlar por otros factores que pueden tener
influencia sobre la volatilidad del producto y de lidiar con potenciales problemas
de endogeneidad.
Clasificacio´n JEL: F23; F32; F36; F44
Palabras clave: Inversio´n extranjera directa; flujos de capital; volatilidad del
producto.
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I. Introduction
There is by now a large literature that has focused on the effects of foreign
direct investment (FDI) on growth. The overall consensus appears to be that,
provided that the right economic environment is in place, FDI will indeed
stimulate growth.5 Much less attention, if at all, has been paid to the link between
capital inflows volatility and output volatility.6 In particular, there has been little
formal analysis of the idea – often found in policy circles – that FDI should be
encouraged because it should lead to lower output volatility. As the logic goes,
FDI is more stable than other sources of capital inflows, most notably portfolio
and other investments (OTR), and therefore should be encouraged in order to
ensure a less volatile level of domestic output.
This paper tackles head on the question of whether more FDI leads to a less
volatile level of output.7 To organize the discussion and provide a guide to the
empirical analysis, we first develop a simple empirical model of the relationship
between output and capital inflows. The model draws on standard portfolio
1 The authors are greatful to Laura Alfaro, Constantino Hevia, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Daniel
Riera-Crichton, Andreas Waldkirch, and, especially, Luis Serven for extremely helpful comments
and suggestions.
2 BlackRock.
3 World Bank.
4 World Bank.
5 See, among others, Alfaro et al (2007, 2010), Borenzstein et al (1998), and Carkovic and
Levine (2005).
6 A related question – the potential beneficial effects of FDI in reducing the frequency of
crises and/or sudden stops – has been addressed in Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann (2001) and
Levchencko and Mauro (2007). For an early, skeptical look at the notion that long-term flows may
be stabilizing, see Claessens, Dooley, and Warner (1995). Using firm level data, Alfaro and Chenz
(2012) analyze the role of FDI on establishment performance before and after the global financial
crisis of 2008.
7 At a firm level and for European countries, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Volosovych (2010)
find a positive effect of foreign ownership on volatility of firms’ outcomes.
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theory in which the volatility of an investor’s portfolio depends on the volatilities
of the underlying investments. We show that output volatility depends not only
on the volatility of FDI andOTR but also on the correlation between FDI and
OTR and the share of FDI in total capital inflows.
The model calls attention to some important caveats that need to be taken
into account for some commonly-held beliefs to be true. For example, if would
seem intuitively obvious that lower FDI volatility should lead to lower output
volatility. This is not, however, necessarily the case. In fact, if the correlation
between FDI and OTR is negative, then lower FDI volatility will increase
output volatility because FDI cannot provide as much insurance against the
volatility of OTR. By the same token, another “obvious” idea – that a higher
share of FDI should lead to lower output volatility – is only true in the model if
the actual share of FDI in total capital inflows is below the share of FDI that
minimizes overall output variability.
We use the model to derive three key testable implications:
• If the correlation between FDI and OTR is zero or positive, output
volatility should also depend positively on FDI volatility and OTR
volatility.
• Output volatility should be an increasing function of the correlation
between FDI and OTR.
• Output volatility should be a decreasing function of the share of FDI in
total capital inflows, particularly when its initial value is low.
We test the model’s predictions using a sample of 59 countries for the period
1970-2009.8 For this purpose, we construct five-year non-overlapping series of
volatilities and other portfolio and macroeconomic variables. Our empirical
findings strongly support our model’s implications.
We control for other possible determinants of output volatility, such as
government spending volatility, terms of trade volatility, and country instability.
We address endogeneity concerns by using three sets of instruments: (i) five-year
non-overlapping lags of portfolio variables, (ii) gravity-based portfolio variables
8 The number of countries was dictated by data availability on foreign direct investment and
other capital flows.
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aiming at capturing regional/location effects, and (iii) five-year non-overlapping
lags of de jure and de facto measures of restrictions on cross-border financial
transactions. Our main findings continue to hold even after controlling for other
factors and using instrumental variables.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our simple empirical
model. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the econometric
estimates. Section 5 concludes. An appendix develops a theoretical model that
formalizes the tight link between capital inflows and output.
II. Empirical model
To organize ideas and guide our empirics, this section develops a simple
empirical model of the relation between output volatility and capital inflows
volatility. Consider a small open economy with the following technology:
Y = AK, (1)
where Y is output, A is a positive technological parameter, and K is a (tradable)
capital good. Let p be the international price of this capital good.9
The capital stock consists of this period’s addition to the existing capital
stock:
K = K−1 + ∆K.
Assume that the purchase of this period’s capital good must be fully financed
by capital inflows, either in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) or
portfolio and other investments (OTR).10 Formally,
∆K =
FDI +OTR
p
.
Solving for p and substituting in (1), we obtain
Y = A˜K−1 + A˜TF, (2)
9 This price could also be interpreted as a rental price. For the purposes of our analysis, we will
assume that this price does not change over time.
10 We are abstracting, of course, from domestic savings as a source of financing in order to focus
exclusively on the effects of volatility of foreign financing on domestic output.
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where
TF ≡ FDI +OTR, (3)
denotes total capital inflows and A˜ ≡ A/p. Output is thus a linear function of
total capital inflows.11
Let Y and TF denote the means of output and total capital flows,
respectively. It then follows from (2) that
σ2Y = A˜
2σ2TF . (4)
Output volatility is thus an increasing function of capital inflows volatility. To
proceed further, we need to impose more structure. Specifically, let us assume
that the stochastic processes for FDI andOTR take the following multiplicative
form:
FDI = FDI (1 + εFDI) , (5)
OTR = OTR (1 + εOTR) , (6)
where FDI and OTR are the means of FDI and OTR, respectively, εFDI ∼
N
(
0, σ2FDI
)
, εOTR ∼ N
(
0, σ2OTR
)
, and εFDI and εOTR are jointly normally
distributed. For further reference, let ρ denote the correlation between εFDI and
εOTR.12
Let φ denote the share of FDI in total capital inflows; that is,
FDI = φTF , (7)
OTR = (1− φ)TF , (8)
where TF is the mean of TF.Since TF is the sum of FDI and OTR, it will
inherit the multiplicative stochastic structure of FDI and OTR. To see this,
11 This very tight link between output and capital flows is the key assumption behind our
empirical model. (While helpful to organize the empirical work, what folows below is, formally,
a mechanical elaboration of this main idea in a stochastic setting and involves no implicit
theorizing.) To provide some theoretical basis for this assumption, the appendix develops a simple
theoretical framework with heterogenous firms which delivers an equilibrium relationship between
FDI and OTR, on the one hand, and output on the other. In this context, the appendix shows
how fluctuations in, for instance, the cost of long-term financing leads to fluctuations in output,
FDI and OTR.
12 The normality assumption is not essential for our results to go through.
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substitute (5) and (6) into (3), and use (7) and (8), to obtain
TF = TF [φ (1 + εFDI) + (1− φ) (1 + εOTR)].
Hence,
σ2TF = TF
2
[
φ2σ2FDI + (1− φ)2 σ2OTR + 2φ (1− φ)σFDIσOTRρ
]
. (9)
From (2), σ2Y = A˜
2σ2TF . Using (9), we can express output volatility as
σ2Y =
(
A˜TF
)2 [
φ2σ2FDI + (1− φ)2 σ2OTR + 2φ (1− φ)σFDIσOTRρ
]
.
(10)
This equation thus relates output volatility (σ2Y ) to the volatility of foreign
direct investment (σ2FDI ), the volatility of portfolio and other investments
(σ2OTR), the correlation between FDI and OTR (ρ), and the share of FDI
in total capital inflows (φ).
Even though the model is extremely simple, expression (10) already warns
us that some commonly-held beliefs regarding the beneficial role of FDI in
bringing about lower output volatility in emerging markets are in fact not obvious
on closer examination. In particular, we can see that while equation (4) indicates
that lower capital inflows volatility does imply lower output volatility, equation
(10) tells us that whether lower FDI volatility will actually translate into lower
output volatility depends on the correlation between FDI and OTR. As will
become clear below, if ρ < 0, lower FDI volatility could actually lead to
higher output volatility! Also, the effect of φ on output volatility is, in principle,
ambiguous. In fact, it is possible that a larger share of FDI will lead to higher,
rather than lower, output volatility. This suggests that we need to be careful in
establishing the conditions under which these ideas may be true and then check
in the data if these conditions hold.
To gain insights into expression (10), let us proceed by considering some
special cases.
• Case 1: Variances of FDI and OTR are the same and the correlation is
one (i.e., σ2FDI = σ
2
OTR and ρ = 1). Expression (10) then reduces to
σ2Y =
(
A˜TF
)2
σ2FDI .
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Output volatility does not depend on φ. Since the variances of FDI
and OTR are the same and the correlation is one, there is essentially
no difference between FDI and OTR and hence the share of FDI is
irrelevant. In this case, higher FDI (or OTR) volatility translates into
higher output volatility.
• Case 2: Variances of FDI and OTR are the same, φ = 0.5, and there is
a perfect negative correlation (i.e., σ2FDI = σ
2
OTR and ρ = −1). In this
case, σ2Y = 0. This can be thought of as the “full insurance” case. Due to
the perfectly negative correlation, equal variances, and equal share, total
capital inflows are constant and hence output volatility is zero.
• Case 3. Variances of FDI and OTR are the same and the correlation is
zero (i.e., σ2FDI = σ
2
OTR and ρ = 0). In this case, expression (10) reduces
to
σ2Y =
(
A˜TF
)2
σ2FDI
[
φ2 + (1− φ)2
]
. (11)
This is the typical benchmark in basic portfolio theory. Think of an
investor with two uncertain sources of income (FDI and OTR) that have
the same variance but are uncorrelated. What is the share of FDI that
would minimize the volatility of the overall portfolio? Set σ2FDI = σ
2
OTR
and ρ = 0 in (10) and differentiate with respect to φ to obtain,
dσ2Y
dφ
= 2
(
A˜TF
)2
σ2FDI (2φ− 1) ≶ 0. (12)
This expression is zero for φ = 1/2 and, as can easily be checked, the
second derivative is positive indicating the existence of a minimum. In
order words, with two uncorrelated sources of income that have the same
variance, splitting the portfolio in half minimizes the overall volatility.
Deviating marginally from φ = 1/2 has, of course, no first-order effect on
output volatility. For values of φ 6= 1/2, however, increasing φ if φ > 1/2
or reducing φ if φ < 1/2 will increase output volatility because the shares
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are getting farther away from the variance-minimizing mix. Formally:
dσ2Y
dφ
∣∣∣∣
φ>1/2
= 2A˜σ2FDI (2φ− 1) > 0, (13)
dσ2Y
dφ
∣∣∣∣
φ<1/2
= 2A˜σ2FDI (2φ− 1) < 0. (14)
Figure 1 illustrates this case by plotting σ2Y as a function of φ for ρ = 0
and σFDI = σOTR = 30. We can see that, as equation (A.5) indicates, the
variance-minimizing value of φ is 0.5 (point A). Given the U-shape of the
curve, moving away from point A in either direction increases σ2Y . Point
B indicates the median value of φ in our sample; 0.31. For any φ between
this value and 0.5, increasing φ will reduce output variability.
Figure 1: Output volatility and share of FDI in total gross capital inflows.
σ(FDI)= σ(OTR)=30, ρ(FDI,OTR)=0
What happens if we deviate from this benchmark portfolio case in terms
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of ρ being different from zero or variances not being the same? Cases 4
and 5 study these deviations from Case 3.
• Case 4. Variances are the same but ρ is different from zero (i.e., σ2FDI =
σ2OTR and ρ 6= 0)
If the correlation is not zero, then it will still be the case that the value of
φ that minimizes output volatility is one-half. Indeed, set σ2FDI = σ
2
OTR
in equation (10) and differentiate with respect to φ to obtain
dσ2Y
dφ
= 2
(
A˜TF
)2
σ2FDI (2φ− 1) (1− ρ) ≶ 0,
which is zero for φ = 1/2. Intuitively – and as (10) makes clear – a
positive correlation increases overall volatility relative to the ρ = 0 case
but does not change the fact that, since FDI and OTR are not perfectly
correlated, the variance-minimizing φ is still one-half.
• Case 5. Correlation is zero but variances are different (i.e., ρ = 0 and
σ2FDI 6= σ2OTR). In this case, the variance-minimizing φ will change. To
see this, set ρ = 0 in (10) and differentiate with respect to φ to obtain
dσ2Y
dφ
= 2
(
A˜TF
)2 [
φ(σ2FDI + σ
2
OTR)− σ2OTR
]
≶ 0.
Setting this expression to zero, we obtain the variance-minimizing value
of φ:
φmin =
σ2OTR
σ2FDI + σ
2
OTR
. (15)
If σ2FDI < σ
2
OTR, then φ
min > 1/2. Intuitively, if FDI is less volatile
than OTR, then it would be optimal to hold more than one-half of the TF
as FDI . Even though the variance-minimizing φ is larger than one-half,
the same intuition developed in Case 3 above holds: deviating from this
variance-minimizing value of φ will increase overall volatility.
Needless to say, in practice countries cannot choose the variance-minimizing
value of φ.13 But all the intuition developed so far will still help us in thinking
13 Even though we could certainly interpret various measures that emerging countries often adopt
to encourage FDI at the expense of other, more volatile, flows as an attempt to increase φ and
reduce output volatility.
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about the data. As an illustration, Figure 2 plots equation (10) for the case of
Turkey in which σFDI = 58.8, σOTR = 168.5, and ρ = −0.23.14 In this case,
the variance-minimizing value of φ is 0.85, given by point A. Given the U-shape
of the curve, moving away from point A in either direction increases σ2Y . Point
B is the actual value of φ for Turkey, φ = 0.14. Since this value of φ is less than
the variance-minimizing φ, increasing φ will reduce output volatility. This will
be one of the main empirical predictions of our model.
Figure 2: Output volatility and share of FDI in total gross capital inflows.
σ(FDI)=58.8, σ(OTR)=168.5, ρ(FDI,OTR)=-0.23
Returning now to the general case captured in equation (10), let us examine
how changes in ρ, σ2FDI , and σ
2
OTR affect output volatility. Taking the
14 See the data section below for the interpretation of the units in which the standard deviations
of FDI and OTR are expressed.
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corresponding partial derivatives, we obtain
dσ2Y
dρ
= 2A˜2TF
2
[φ (1− φ)σFDIσOTR] > 0, (16)
dσ2Y
dσFDI
= 2A˜2TF
2 [
φ2σFDI + φ (1− φ)σOTRρ
]
≷ 0, (17)
dσ2Y
dσOTR
= 2A˜2TF
2
[
(1− φ)2 σOTR + φ (1− φ)σFDIρ
]
≷ 0. (18)
As equation (16) makes clear, a higher ρ always increases output volatility.
On the other hand, expressions (17) and (18) indicate that the effects of σ2FDI
and σ2OTR are ambiguous. To understand this ambiguity, think of the case in
which ρ = −1, φ = 0.5, and σFDI < σOTR. Equation (17) then reduces to
dσ2Y
dσFDI
= 2A˜TF
2
φ2 (σFDI − σOTR) < 0.
Here a reduction in FDI volatility would increase output volatility. Intuitively,
with perfect negative correlation between foreign direct investment and portfolio
and other investments and σFDI < σOTR, FDI volatility is actually a good
thing because then FDI can offer more insurance against OTR. In other
words, if FDI exhibits very low volatility, then it cannot offset the much higher
volatility of OTR.
In the data, however, ρ is on average close to zero (sample median is
0.05), in which case an increase in the volatility of either FDI or OTR will
increase output volatility. Intuitively, with zero correlation, higher volatility is
unambiguously bad because it contributes to output volatility directly without
offering any insurance.
To summarize, the main predictions of our empirical model are as follows:
• Output volatility should be an increasing function of the correlation
between FDI and OTR.
• Output volatility should be an increasing function of FDI volatility and
OTR volatility (under the assumption that ρ ≥ 0).
• Output volatility should be a decreasing function of the share of FDI in
total capital inflows (under the assumption that the actual value of φ is
below the variance-minimizing value of φ).
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III. Data
This study uses a sample of 59 countries: 20 industrial and 39 developing
countries for the period 1970-2009.15 Data frequency is annual. Data for real
GDP, gross capital inflows, government spending, inflation, and terms of trade
data comes from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic
Outlook (WEO), both from the IMF. For capital flows, we use foreign direct
investment, portfolio investment, and other investment gross inflows data. As is
common practice (see, for instance, BIS (2009)) we group together portfolio and
other investments as being more short-term in nature than FDI and denote this
aggregate by OTR.16
The standard deviations and correlations of all variables are computed based
on their cyclical components. For this purpose, we use the Hodrick-Prescott
filter with a smoothing parameter of 6.5 (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). Since the
cyclical component is expressed in terms of percentage deviations of the actual
value from the trend, the corresponding standard deviation is also expressed in
those terms. For example, the volatility of FDI mentioned above for Turkey
(σFDI = 58.8) means that, on average, the level of FDI is 58.8 percentage
points away from its trend. Given that σOTR = 168.5 for Turkey, this implies
that portfolio and other investments are almost three times as volatile as FDI .
Another common practice in the literature (see, for instance, Albuquerque,
Loayza, and Serven, 2005) is to normalize capital flows such as FDI by dividing
them by GDP. The rationale behind this methodology is to control for country
size and avoid nonstationarity problems. While helpful in a different context,
we feel that this normalization would not be appropriate in our case because
the volatility of such a ratio would capture the volatility of both FDI and
15 Industrial countries comprise Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Developing countries comprise Argentina,
Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Rep., Ecuador,
El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Guatemala, Hong Kong (SAR China), Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Jordan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
16 Specifically, OTR includes portfolio investment (i.e, equity and portfolio debt flows) as well as
loans, currency, and trade credits.
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output. Since the latter will be our dependent variable, our empirical analysis
would suffer from endogeneity problems by construction. Moreover, our focus
on the cyclical component of capital inflows avoids nonstationarity problems
altogether. Notice also that because we measure the cyclical component in
terms of percentage deviations of the actual value from the trend, our volatility
measures are independent of the size of the economy or capital inflows. Indeed,
using cross-country data, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the correlation
between σFDI and average FDI , as well as the correlation between σOTR and
average OTR, are equal to zero at a 5 percent significance level.
We now turn to a broad look at the data. In particular, we focus on volatility
and basic statistics discussed in the previous section. Figure 3 shows output
volatility.17 While output volatility varies substantially across countries, the
median is almost twice as large in developing countries as in industrial countries.
Figure 4 shows total gross inflows volatility. Not surprisingly, the median of total
gross inflows into developing countries is more than one and a half times that of
industrial countries.18
We now turn to the volatilities of FDI and OTR. Figure 5 shows the ratio
of OTR volatility to FDI volatility. The figure is consistent with the idea in
the literature that OTR inflows are more volatile than FDI inflows. Indeed,
the ratio is larger than one for more than 85 percent of the countries in our
sample. The median volatility of OTR is close to 120, compared to less than
half (about 44) for FDI . Moreover, the median in developing countries ratios
is 76 percent higher than that in industrial economies, reflecting in particular the
higher volatility of OTR. In fact, the median FDI volatility is 48 for industrial
counties and 41 for developing countries. In sharp contrast, the median OTR
volatility is about 30 percent higher in developing countries than in advanced
economies (120 for developing countries and 85 for industrial countries).
Figure 6 shows that the share of FDI in total gross capital inflows is
typically quite low, with the sample median being 0.32. Indeed, for more than
60 percent of the countries, the share is less than 0.5. Furthermore, the median
share is three times as high in developing countries as in industrial countries.
17 In this and following plots, light (yellow) bars denote developing countries while black bars
indicate industrial countries.
18 Omitting Sudan and Korea (which have very high total gross inflows volatility) does not affect
our results.
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Figure 3: Output volatility.
THE EFFECT OF CAPITAL-FLOWS COMPOSITION ON OUTPUT VOLATILITY 109
Figure 4: Total gross inflows volatility
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Finally, Figure 7 depicts the correlation between OTR and FDI . We can see
wide variation in this figure across countries, with the sample median being 0.05
and the median for developing countries -0.02.
Figure 5: Ratio of OTR over FDI volatilities.
Taking into account the median values of the ratio of OTR volatility to
FDI volatility and the correlation between OTR and FDI for industrial and
developing countries, we find that the φ (i.e., the share of FDI in total capital
inflows) that minimizes output volatility (i.e., expression 10) is 0.7 and 0.8 for
industrial and developing countries, respectively. These values are much higher
than the actual ones: 0.15 for industrial economies and 0.45 for developing
countries. The difference in the optimal shares of FDI reflects the fact that
(i) the relative ratio of OTR volatility to FDI volatility is higher in developing
countries than in industrial ones (3.7 versus 2.1) and (ii) the correlation between
OTR and FDI is positive (0.14) for industrial countries but slightly negative
(-0.02) for developing countries. In other words, a higher share of FDI
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Figure 6: Median share of gross FDI inflows in total gross capital inflows.
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in total capital inflows is more beneficial for developing countries than for
industrial economies because (i) it reduces total capital flows volatility directly
by substituting a more volatile source of capital (OTR) for one that is less
volatile (FDI) and (ii) it provides some insurance given the negative (though
rather small) correlation.
Figure 7: Correlation between OTR and FDI gross inflows.
IV. Empirical evidence
In this section we test the main empirical implications derived in Section 2.
First, output volatility should depend positively on FDI and OTR volatility.
Second, output volatility should be an increasing function of the correlation
between FDI and OTR. Third, for low values of the FDI share, output
volatility should be a decreasing function of the share of FDI in total capital
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inflows.19
We first show our benchmark regressions that link output volatility to the
variables highlighted in the empirical model of Section 2. We then control for
other variables that, in practice, could affect output variability. We then address
endogeneity problems.
IV.1 Basic regressions
Following the empirical growth literature, we use non-overlapping five-
year averages. Table 1 reports the basic results using country and five-year
fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and we also allow for within-country
correlation (i.e., clustered by country). We normalize σFDI and σOTR to be
between 0 and 100 to make regression coefficients easier to read.20 Columns 1-5
test the key implications of our model one variable at a time and column 6 tests
them all together.
Results are as predicted by our model. Higher FDI and OTR volatility
increase output volatility (columns 1 and 2). A higher correlation between FDI
and OTR increases output volatility (column 3). When we include the share
of FDI in total capital inflows (column 4), it appears not to matter, contrary
to our model’s prediction. However, as captured by (A.5)-(14), the expected
relationship between a higher share of FDI in total inflows and lower output
volatility tends to occur when the share is small or, to be precise, smaller
than optimal. In the particular case of equal variances and zero correlation, an
increase in the share of FDI will reduce output volatility when the initial share
is smaller than 0.5 (see equation (14)). To capture this effect, we interact this
term with a dummy variable that equals one when the share is smaller than the
sample median share (0.32). Column 5 shows that, indeed, after introducing this
distinction, output volatility is a decreasing function of the share of FDI in total
capital inflows only when its initial value is low. Finally, when all explanatory
variables are included (column 6), the size of the coefficients and significance
levels remain essentially unchanged.
19 In principle, one would like to evaluate the interaction effects in a more elaborated way (i.e., by
introducing all neccesary interaction terms). Sample size, however, severely restricts our ability
to follow such an approach.
20 After the normalization, σFDI and σOTR range between 0 and 14.89 and 0.04 and 100,
respectively.
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Table 1: Basic regression results. Dependent variable is output volatility.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ(FDI) 0.18*** 0.16***
(3.4) (3.5)
σ(OTR) 0.01*** 0.01***
(3.8) (3.9)
ρ(FDI,OTR) 0.24* 0.23*
(1.7) (1.8)
FDI share -0.07 0.03 0.03
(-0.9) (0.9) (0.9)
FDI share x low share dummy -0.56** -0.53**
(-2.2) (-2.1)
R2 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.18
Observations 295 295 295 295 295 295
Countries 59 59 59 59 59 59
Note: Regressions include country and five-year fixed effects. t-statistics are reported in
brackets. Standard errors are robust and allow for within-country correlation (i.e., clustered
by country). R2 in all regressions corresponds to within-country R2. Constant and low share
dummy coefficients are not reported. x, *, **, and *** indicate statistically significance at
the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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IV.2 Controlling for other determinants of output volatility
Having established that output volatility depends on the factors predicted by
the portfolio model developed in Section 2, we now proceed to control for other
factors that could also affect output volatility. While the basic regressions of
Subsection 4.1 control for country and five-year fixed effects, other factors such
as idiosyncratic external shocks, fiscal policy volatility, and country instability
could also affect output volatility.
Fiscal policy volatility is measured using the standard deviation of the
cyclical component of government spending. We proxy external shocks volatility
using the standard deviation of the cyclical component of terms of trade. Country
instability is measured using the average of internal and external conflicts from
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Internal conflict refers to political
violence within the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The
risk rating assigned is composed of three subcomponents: civil war/coup threat,
terrorism/political violence, and civil disorder. External conflict refers to the
risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent
external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions,
territorial disputes, sanctions, and so forth) to violent external pressure (ranging
from cross-border conflicts to all-out war). The risk rating assigned is composed
of three subcomponents: war, cross-border conflict, and foreign pressures. We
normalized this variable so that it varies between 0 and 100, with a low value
indicating low risk.
Results are reported in Table 2. Columns 1 to 3 show the effects of the
control variables one at a time. The three variables have the expected signs:
higher fiscal and terms of trade volatility and more country instability increase
output volatility. Surprisingly enough, however, terms of trade volatility is not
statistically significant. The reason is that we are also including five-year fixed
effects. If such fixed effects are not included, then the coefficient of the terms
of trade volatility is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. We thus
conclude that, while there is some country idiosyncratic variation over time, an
important fraction of terms of trade volatility is common to most countries. This
is reflected, for instance in the large terms of trade volatility present in the 1970s
and early 1980s (as a result of the oil shocks) and in 2005-2009 (generalized rise
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in commodity prices) compared to the 1990-2004 period.
When including all controls (column 4), fiscal policy volatility becomes
insignificant due to its high correlation with country instability.21 More
importantly for our purposes, Column 6 indicates that the size and significance
of our four explanatory variables (FDI volatility, OTR volatility, correlation
between FDI and OTR, and interacted share of FDI) remain essentially
unchanged relative to column 6 in Table 1.
IV.3 Adressing endogeneity
This section addresses potential endogeneity problems. One could
reasonably argue that the positive relationship between output volatility and
FDI and OTR volatility may reflect the fact that higher GDP volatility
increases the volatility of capital inflows. In other words, the causality may
run from output volatility to inflows volatility rather than the other way around.
In the same vein, reductions in the share of FDI could reflect the reluctance of
foreign firms to invest for the long-term in highly volatile economies.
As is the case in the empirical macro literature that has assessed the influence
of FDI on economic growth (see, for instance, Lensink and Morrisey, 2001 and
Alfaro, 2003), we lack obvious instruments for σFDI , σOTR, ρ(FDI,OTR),
and FDI share. We then use three sets of instruments. First, we follow
the above-mentioned macro literature in using lagged FDI as an instrument
for current FDI . In our case, this amounts to using the lagged five-year
average of each portfolio variable as an instrument. For example, we use the
σOTR for the period 1970-1974 to instrument for the period 1975-1979. The
Spearman’s rank correlation between σFDI and its lagged five-year value is
0.38. The corresponding correlation is 0.26 for σOTR and 0.30 for FDI share.
In all cases, the correlation is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In
other words, there seems to be a positive association between the volatilities of
capital inflows over time, even at the five-year frequency. Unfortunately, the
correlation between ρ(FDI,OTR) and its lagged five-year value is statistically
insignificant.
Our second set of instruments uses a geographical/gravity approach aimed at
capturing the influence of regional effects. Capital inflows respond to economic
21 The correlation is 0.40 and statistically different from zero at the one percent level.
THE EFFECT OF CAPITAL-FLOWS COMPOSITION ON OUTPUT VOLATILITY 117
Table 2: Regression results with control variables. Dependent variable is output
volatility.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
σ(gov. Spending) 0.04** 0.02 0.03
(2.6) (0.6) (0.8)
σ(terms of trade) 0.02 0.001 0.02
(1.0) (0.03) (0.7)
Country instability 0.02** 0.03** 0.01
(2.1) (2.5) (0.9)
σ(FDI) 0.17***
(4.0)
σ(OTR) 0.01***
(2.9)
ρ(FDI,OTR) 0.24*
(1.9)
FDI share 0.01
(0.4)
FDI share x low share dummy -0.52**
(-2.0)
R2 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.26
Observations 376 388 321 279 225
Countries 49 49 56 47 47
Note: Regressions include country and five-year fixed effects. t-statistics are
reported in brackets. Standard errors are robust and allow for within-country
correlation (i.e., clustered by country). R2 in all regressions corresponds to
within-country R2. Constant and low share dummy coefficients are not reported.
x, *, **, and *** indicate statistically significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
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and political fundamentals which are often shared by different countries within
a region (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996; Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1995; Alba,
Bhattacharya, Claessens, Gosh, and Herna´ndez, 2000; Corbo and Herna´ndez,
2001). During the 1980s, for example, Latin America experienced such political
and economic instability that international investors became reluctant to invest
for the long-term. Indeed, FDI share was just 0.24 for Latin America during
the 1980s, compared to 0.51 during the 1990s, and almost 0.75 during the 2000s.
To exploit this geographical dimension, we instrument each portfolio variable
using the following expression:
Iit =
∑
j
1
distij
Ijt, i 6= j,
where Iij represents the portfolio variable and distij measures the distance
between the capital cities of countries i and j. In other words, we instrument
a country’s five-year observation of each portfolio variable with the weighted
sum of such variable for other countries. The weight for each other country
decreases with its distance. This gravity approach is thus a more generalized
version of the idea behind regional effects. The Spearman’s rank correlation
between ρ(FDI,OTR) and the suggested geographical instrument is 0.35 and
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The gravity approach proves to be
a good strategy to predict the patterns of correlation between FDI and OTR.
Unfortunately, the correlations for the other portfolio variables are statistically
insignificant.
To complement the two previous sets of instruments, we also rely on the
literature regarding the determinants of capital flows. In particular we focus
on determinants that may help determine portfolio variables, but not have a
direct effect on output. Montiel and Reinhart (1999) find that, by imposing
capital controls, countries are able to increase the share of FDI . Generally
speaking, policies that punish short-term flows should, in principle, induce
foreign investors to increase long-term flows. We use three variables to account
for this effect. First, we use the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2006) to
measure de jure financial openness. This index, which measures a country’s
capital account openness, is based on a binary dummy variable that codifies the
tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. A
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high value of this index is an indication of low de jure financial integration.
Second, we use the ratio of total foreign assets and liabilities to GDP from
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) to measure de facto financial integration. A
high value of this index indicates a high degree of de facto financial integration.
Lastly, we use the investment profile index from the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG). This investment profile assesses factors affecting the risk to
investment that are not covered by other political, economic, and financial risk
components. The risk rating assigned is composed of three subcomponents:
contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment delays. We
normalized this variable so that it ranges between 0 and 100, with a low (high)
value indicating low (high) risk. We use the five-year lag of these three variables
to take care of reverse causality concerns (i.e. ,the possibility that output
volatility leads to investment risk). The Spearman’s rank correlation between
FDI share and the five-year lag of the Chinn-Ito index is -0.14, while the
correlation with the five-year lag of investment profile is 0.18. In both cases,
the correlation is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These findings
support Montiel and Reinhart’s (1999) arguments. Moreover, in line with the
rationale behind some recent policy measures in countries such as Brazil, more
capital controls (i.e., lower de jure financial openness) reduce σOTR. The
Spearman’s rank correlation between σOTR and the five-year lag of the Chinn-
Ito index is statistically significant and equal to -0.19.
Having checked that the proposed sets of instruments seem to be good
predictors for the variables they are instrumenting for, we proceed to estimate
instrumental variables regressions. Table 3 shows the instrumental variable
regressions. In all cases we cannot reject the overidentification tests at a 5 percent
confidence level. The instruments are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated
with the error term) and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from
the estimated equation. Moreover, as suggested by the discussion above,
instrumental variable regressions confirm that in almost all cases the excluded
instruments are not weak instruments (i.e., they are strongly correlated with the
endogenous regressors). Column 1 shows that our previous empirical findings
hold. The only exception is σOTR: while the sign of the coefficient is positive, it
is not statistically significant.22
22 It is worth noting that the sample size of the instrumental variable regression has fallen by
almost 45 percent (from 295 and 59 countries in Table 1 to 171 and 38 countries in Table 3).
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Table 3: Instrumental variable regression results with control variables. Dependent
variable is output volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
σ(FDI) 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.15**
(4.0) (3.5) (3.3) (2.7) (2.2)
σ(OTR) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(1.0) (1.0) (1.3) (0.9) (1.0)
ρ(FDI,OTR) 0.64** 0.61* 0.47* 0.58* 0.46x
(2.0) (1.9) (1.7) (1.8) (1.6)
FDI share -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04
(-0.3) (-0.2) (-1.1) (-0.3) (-0.5)
FDI share x low share dummy -1.18** -1.21** -0.94* -1.21** -1.14**
(-2.4) (-2.2) (-1.8) (-2.4) (-2.0)
σ(gov. Spending) 0.01 0.01
(0.5) (0.7)
σ(terms of trade) 0.07 0.04
(1.0) (1.2) (0.8)
Country instability 0.02*** 0.02***
(2.2) (2.4)
Overidentification tests 15.2* 14.7* 14.5* 14.9* 13.3
Weak identification tests
σ(FDI) 30.1*** 30.4*** 53.0*** 25.1*** 48.9***
σ(OTR) 1.7x 1.6x 1.5 1.5 1.4
ρ(FDI,OTR) 7.3*** 7.6*** 7.1*** 7.3*** 7.6***
FDI share 11.1*** 10.4*** 10.5*** 9.6*** 8.6***
FDI share x low share dummy 2.2** 1.8* 2.2** 1.9* 1.5
Observations 171 168 171 171 168
Countries 38 38 38 38 38
Note: Regressions include country and five-year fixed effects. t-statistics are reported
in brackets. Standard errors are robust and allow for within-country correlation (i.e.,
clustered by country). R2 in all regressions corresponds to within-country R2. Constant
and low share dummy coefficients are not reported. The over-identification test is the Chi
squared Hansen’s J statistic; the null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous
(i.e., uncorrelated with the error term). The weak-identification test is the first-stage
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments; the null hypothesis is that
the model is weakly identified (i.e., the excluded instruments have a nonzero but small
correlation with the endogenous regressors). x, *, **, and *** indicate statistically
significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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We now add control variables. While terms of trade volatility is typically
treated as exogenous, this is certainly not the case of government spending
volatility and country instability. Indeed, it seems reasonable to argue that
higher output volatility might increase government spending volatility and lead
to more instability. To account for this potential reverse causality, we use the
five-year lag of government spending volatility and country instability. The
Spearman’s rank correlation between σgov.spending and its five-year lag is 0.56
and the corresponding correlation for country instability is 0.84. In both cases,
the correlation is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Columns 2 to 4
show the results of including each determinant one at a time. Column 5 includes
all portfolio and control variables. The inclusion of these determinants does not
change the main results reported in column 1.
V. Conclusions
A commonly-held belief is that a larger share of FDI in total capital inflows
will reduce output volatility. There is, however, little, if any, formal evidence
on this channel. Based on standard portfolio theory, we first develop a simple
econometric model that calls attention to some important caveats. In particular,
lower FDI volatility will reduce output volatility only if the correlation between
FDI and other flows is positive (which is not always the case in the data). Also,
a larger share of FDI will reduce output volatility only if the actual share of
FDI is below the variance-minimizing share. Our model thus yields three
testable implications: (i) output volatility should depend positively on FDI
and OTR volatility; (ii) output volatility should be an increasing function of
the correlation between FDI and OTR; and (iii) output volatility should be a
decreasing function of the share of FDI in total capital inflows (when the initial
share is low). We find strong support in the data for all three implications, even
after controlling for other factors that influence output volatility and for possible
endogeneity problems.
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A. Appendix
This appendix develops a simple theoretical model that provides a theoretical
illustration of the key assumption in the empirical model – as captured in
equation (2) – that there exists a tight link between output and capital inflows.
In the theoretical model, such a link will arise endogenously as firms choose
whether to finance investment with either short-term or long-term external
funding.23 In the aggregate, the economy uses both sources of finance and
changes in, say, the cost of external funding will lead to changes in output,
external finance, and its composition.
Consider a small open economy with a continuum of risk-neutral firms that
produce the same final (tradable) good, denoted by q, using the same (tradable)
capital, denoted by k. Firms are indexed by their productivity parameter, γ (0 <
γ < 1), which is the only source of heterogeneity. Firms “live” for two periods.
Firms buy capital before production and hold it for the entire two periods, after
which it depreciates completely.
The production function of a γ firm is given by
qt = αk
γ , t = 1, 2,
where α > 0 is a productivity parameter. By construction, output is constant
across periods. Firms need to borrow from abroad to finance the purchase of
capital. Borrowing can be either short-term or long-term but not a combination
of both. Short-term funding (i.e., portfolio investment) requires repayment
of principal and interest at the end of the first period. Long-term funding
(i.e., foreign direct investment) requires repayment of principal plus interest
only after two periods. The one-period short-term and long-term interest rates
are, respectively, rs and rl. We assume that rs < rl, reflecting the idea that
international lenders may have a preference for a more “liquid” asset.
As an important benchmark, we first solve the firm’s problem under short-
term financing and no repayment constraint. We then impose the repayment
constraint for short-term financing. We then solve for the case of long-term
financing. We then compare profits in the two cases (short-term financing
23 At the cost of complicating the model, we could have included domestic saving as well. Our
model, however, can be interpreted as applying to funding needs that go beyond domestic savings,
the typical situation for a developing country.
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and repayment constraint versus long-term financing) to find out when a firm
will chose one or the other. We finally aggregate over all firms to obtain the
economy’s aggregate capital stock and output and analyze how the equilibrium
changes if the cost of long-term financing changes.
A.1 Short-term financing and no repayment constraint
Denote by p the world relative price of q in terms of k and by bt, t = 0, 1
net foreign assets. Think of period 0 as the period in which the capital stock
is purchased. Periods 1 and 2 are the periods in which the firm operates (i.e.,
produces and sells). The flow budget constraints are thus given by
b0 = −k, (A.1)
b1 = (1 + r
s)b0 + pαk
γ − pi1, (A.2)
0 = (1 + rs)b1 + pαk
γ − pi2, (A.3)
where pit, t = 1, 2, denotes dividends paid by the firm. Combining these flow
constraints, we obtain an intertemporal constraint:
Π =
(2 + rs)
(1 + rS)2
pαkγ − k, (A.4)
where Π(≡ pi1/(1+rs)+pi2/(1+rs)2) is the present discounted value of profits
as of time 0.
Firms choose k to maximize (A.4). The first-order condition for capital takes
the form:
(2 + rs)
(1 + rs)2
pαγkγ−1 = 1. (A.5)
At an optimum, the firm equates the present discounted value of the value of the
marginal productivity to the cost of capital. Solving for the capital stock, we
obtain
k =
[
(2 + rs)
(1 + rs)2
γpα
] 1
1−γ
. (A.6)
Substituting this expression into (A.4), we can write profits as:
Π = k
(
1
γ
− 1
)
. (A.7)
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As expected, profits are positive since, by assumption, γ ∈ (0, 1).
In the absence of any additional constraint, all firms would choose short-
term financing because, by assumption, it is cheaper than long-term financing.
To have a meaningful choice between short-term and long-term financing, we
will now introduce a repayment constraint.
A.2 Short-term financing and repayment constraint
Suppose now that a firm can access short-term credit only if it can pay back
the loan at the end of the first period. Formally,
pαkγ − (1 + rs)k > 0. (A.8)
Let us check if this repayment constraint binds for the unconstrained problem
that we just solved. To this effect, substitute (A.6) into the last expression to
obtain
1 + rs
2 + rs
> γ.
Firms whose γ satisfies this condition will thus still be able to choose short-term
financing and remain at the first best because the repayment constraint does not
bind. Intuitively, low γ firms optimally choose a low level of capital (i.e., units
of capital with high marginal productivity) and are thus more likely to satisfy
constraint (A.8) given that the repayment cost per unit of capital (1 + rs) does
not depend the level of capital.
On the other hand, the unconstrained solution for firms with γ > (1 +
rs)/(2 + rs) violates condition (A.8). These firms will thus need to choose
between “constrained short-term financing” (i.e., choose the optimal level of
capital subject to condition (A.8)) or long-term financing. The trade-off is thus
between remaining in a first-best equilibrium but facing a higher cost of capital
(long-term financing) or choosing a constrained level of capital but at a lower
cost (constrained short-term financing).
If constraint (A.8) binds, then the capital stock is given by
k|constrained short-term =
(
pα
1 + rs
) 1
1−γ
. (A.9)
If we compare this level of capital with the unconstrained level of capital, given
by expression (A.6), for a firm with γ > (1 + rs)/(2 + rs), we can see that
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the stock of capital in the constrained case is lower. In other words, to access
short-term financing, the firm needs to have a suboptimally low level of capital
to generate enough profits in the first period to repay the loan.
A.3 Maximization under long-term financing
Let us now compute profits under long-term financing. The budget
constraints remain the same as in (A.1)-(A.3) with rl in lieu of rs. Further, since
a firm that chooses long-term financing is still operating in a first-best world, the
choice of capital will be given by condition (A.6) with rl in lieu of rs. Profits
will thus be given by (A.7) with the corresponding choice of capital.
A.4 Comparison
Firms with γ > (1 + rs)/(2 + rs) will choose long-term financing over
short-term financing as long as profits are larger:
Π|long-term > Π|short-term constrained .
Using equations (A.6) and (A.7), this condition reduces to
1 >
[
(1 + rl)2
(2 + rl) (1 + rs)γ
] 1
1−γ
. (A.10)
Suppose to fix ideas that rl = rs. In this case, this last expression reduces to
1 >
[
(1 + rl)
(2 + rl) γ
] 1
1−γ
.
Since the choice is only relevant for firms with γ > (1 + rs) / (2 + rs), the
condition will always hold. In other words, if rl = rs, then all these firms would
choose long-term financing because the cost is the same as short-term financing
but they are not subject to the repayment constraint (which, by construction, is
binding).
But our maintained assumption is, of course, that rl > rs. In that case,
condition (A.10), holding with equality, defines a threshold value of γ, denoted
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by γ∗, which is given by
γ∗ =
(1 + rl)2
(1 + rs) (2 + rl)
. (A.11)
We now establish the following result:
Claim 1 Firms with γ ≥ γ∗ (γ < γ∗) will choose long-term (short-term)
financing.
Proof. Consider condition (A.10). Differentiating the right-hand side and
evaluating the corresponding expression at γ = γ∗, we obtain
d
[
(1+rl)2
(2+rl)(1+rs)γ
] 1
1−γ
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
γ=γ∗
=
−1
(1− γ) γ < 0.
Set γ = γ∗ in condition (A.10). By construction, it will hold as an equality. An
increase in γ will then reduce the RHS, which means that long-term profits will
be higher than constrained short-term profits. The reverse is true for a fall in γ.
Intuitively, firms with a large γ (i.e., γ > γ∗) are firms that find it more
efficient to operate on a larger scale (and thus would be hurt more by the
repayment constraint) and hence would be willing to pay the higher cost of long-
term financing in order to not be subject to the repayment constraint. In contrast,
smaller firms (i.e., firms with γ < γ∗) would rather not pay the additional cost
of financing and choose a second-best level of capital.
From (A.11), we can see that γ∗ increases with rl and decreases with rs.
Intuitively, an increase in rl makes long-term financing more expensive. As
a result, marginal firms will choose to switch to short-term financing (i.e., γ∗
increases). Conversely, an increase in rs makes short-term financing more
expensive and hence marginal firms will choose to switch to long-term financing
(i.e., γ∗ decreases).
A.5 Aggregation
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As has been established above, there are three types of firms in this economy
depending on the value of γ:
• The range 0 < γ ≤ 1+rs2+rs consists of firms that are operating in a first-best
world with short-term financing.
• The range 1+rs2+rs < γ ≤ γ∗ consists of firms that are operating under
constrained short-term financing (i.e., these are firms that would violate
the repayment constraint if they chose the first-best level of capital).
• The range γ∗ < γ < 1 consists of firms that are operating with long-term
financing.
Aggregate capita and output are thus given by, respectively,
Capital =
∫ γ˜
0
[
(2 + rs)
(1 + rs)2
γpα
] 1
1−γ
dγ
+
∫ γ∗
γ˜
(
pα
1 + rs
) 1
1−γ
dγ +
∫ 1
γ∗
[ (
2 + rl
)
(1 + rl)2
γpα
] 1
1−γ
dγ,(A.12)
Output =
∫ γ˜
0
α
[
(2 + rs)
(1 + rs)2
γpα
] γ
1−γ
dγ
+
∫ γ∗
γ˜
α
(
pα
1 + rs
) γ
1−γ
dγ +
∫ 1
γ∗
α
[ (
2 + rl
)
(1 + rl)2
γpα
] γ
1−γ
dγ.(A.13)
where γ˜ ≡ (1 + rs)/ (2 + rs).24
Since the first two types of firms buy capital with short-term borrowing
(denote it by POR), while the last type of firm buys it with long term borrowing
(denote it by FDI), we can write
POR =
∫ γ˜
0
[
(2 + rs)
(1 + rs)2
γpα
] 1
1−γ
dγ +
∫ γ∗
γ˜
(
pα
1 + rs
) 1
1−γ
dγ,(A.14)
FDI =
∫ 1
γ∗
[ (
2 + rl
)
(1 + rl)2
γpα
] 1
1−γ
dγ. (A.15)
24 In our model, firms hold no initial capital so the capital stock can be thought of as investment
financed, as made clear below, by POR and FDI.
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We thus have an economy with heterogeneous firms in which the
composition of external financing is endogenously determined based on each
firm’s productivity and the cost of short-term and long-term financing. This gives
us a simple framework to ask how a change in the cost of long-term financing
changes the equilibrium.
A.6 Changes in the cost of long-term financing
What are the effects of a change in rl? Specifically, suppose that rl is lower;
how does the equilibrium described above change?25
Using Leibniz rule, we can compute the changes in capital and output from
equations (A.12) and (A.13), respectively:
d (capital)
drl
= −
∫ 1
γ∗
γpα
1− γ
[ (
2 + rl
)
(1 + rl)2
γpα
] γ
1−γ (3 + rl)
(1 + rl)3
dγ < 0,
d (Output)
drl
= −
∫ 1
γ∗
p (γα)2
1− γ
[ (
2 + rl
)
(1 + rl)2
γpα
] 2γ−1
1−γ (3 + rl)
(1 + rl)3
dγ < 0.
Capital and output thus increase. Intuitively, a fall in rl affects capital and output
through two channels:
• From (A.11), we can see that a higher rl reduces γ∗. This means that
some marginal firms that were relying on short-term financing will switch
to long-term financing. At the margin, however, the capital stock of these
firms does not change and thus output is not affected.26
• The capital stock (and thus output) of firms that rely on long-term
financing increases.
25 Technically, we are solving for the same perfect foresight path for different values of rl. This
can be interpreted as either two economies with different values of rl or, more appropriately for
our purposes, as an unanticipated change in rl at the beginning of a third period in which the
economy goes through the same cycle.
26 To see that capital does not change, notice that expression (A.6), with rl in lieu of rs and
evaluated at γ = γ∗, is the same as equation (A.9).
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What happens to FDI and POR?
dFDI
drl
= −
(
dγ∗
drl
)[ (
2 + rl
)
(1 + rl)2
γpα
] 1
1−γ∗
+
∫ 1
γ∗
γpα
1− γ
[ (
2 + rl
)
(1 + rl)2
γpα
] 1
1−γ−1 d
[
(2+rl)
(1+rl)2
]
drl
dγ < 0,
dPOR
drl
=
(
dγ∗
drl
)
α
(
pα
1 + rs
) γ∗
1−γ∗
> 0.
In absolute terms, FDI increases and POR falls. The share of FDI also
increases because FDI increases by more than total capital inflows (given that
POR falls). Intuitively, FDI increases for two reasons. First, firms that relied
on long-term financing are now borrowing more. Second, some marginal firms
that were relying on POR have now switched to FDI . The change in FDI is
thus larger than the change in the capital stock.
It would be easy to accommodate random changes in rl in our model as long
as firms continue to be risk-neutral. In that case, uncertainty regarding changes
in rl (or rs for that matter) would not change the firms’ behavior derived above
(with the expected value of rl and rs replacing the actual values). We could
imagine that every third period rl is drawn from some distribution and the above
equilibrium materializes. In such a scenario, an increase in the volatility of
rl would lead to higher volatility in output, investment, FDI , POR, and the
respective shares. Clearly, being endogenous, the higher volatility of capital
inflows or FDI is not “causing” higher output volatility. Rather they are both
endogenous responses to the higher volatility in the cost of long-term financing.
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